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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW

New York Court of Appeals adopts the present sense impression
exception to the rule against hearsay
The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule
refers to a statement that describes or explains an event while the
event is being perceived.' Because the statement is made contemporaneously with the event, the risk of fabrication and memory
loss are diminished.2 Scholars and courts disagree on the amount
and type of corroboration, if any, required to assure the reliability
of a present sense impression. Similarly, disagreement exists
over whether such a statement may be admitted if made by an
1 See CHARLEs
T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 271, at 211-15 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (discussing developments of present sense impression
exception).
The present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay was first articulated by James B. Thayer. James B. Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarationsas
a Partof the Res Gesta (pts. 1 & 2), 14 Am. L. REV. 817, 15 AM. L. REV. 1, 71 (1880-81)
[hereinafter Thayer I and Thayer II, respectively]. Thayer proposed that statements
made near in time to that which they seek to prove are reliable and should be acknowledged as an exception to the hearsay rule. Thayer II, supra, at 71,107.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have codified the present sense impression exception as follows: "A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter."
FED. R. Evm. 803(1); see also William G. Passannante, Note, Res Gestae, The Present
Sense Impression Exception and Extrinsic Corroborationunder FederalRule of Evidence 803(1) and Its State Counterparts, 17 Fo~m-Am URB. L.J. 89, 99 n.66 (1989)
(analogizing present sense impression to baseball game commentary).
2 McCoinncK, supra note 1, § 271, at 211-12. The risk of fabrication is diminished
because the declarant has no time for reflection, and the risk of memory loss is eliminated because the utterance occurred while the event was taking place. Id.; see also
infra note 23 (discussing contemporaneity requirement).
3 See People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 736, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d
696, 700 (1993); infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text (discussing confusion surrounding corroboration requirement).
Both Thayer and Morgan favored a strict corroboration requirement. See Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of UtterancesAdmissible as Res Gestae,
31 YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922); Thayer II, supra note 1, at 107. Morgan stated that the
declaration is usually made to a third party who testifies to the declaration on the
vitness stand and is therefore subject to cross-examination. Id. at 236. See generally
Passannante, supra note 1, at 100-05 (questioning whether present sense impression
exception contains corroboration requirement); Franci Neely Beck, Note, The Present
Sense Impression, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1068-74 (1978) (proposing corroboration requirement under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) only when declarant is available);
Note, The PresentSense Impression HearsayException:An Analysis of the Contemporaneity and CorroborationRequirements, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 666, 676-77 (1976) [here-
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unidentified declarant,4 particularly if the statement is admitted
against a criminal defendant
who has a constitutional right to
5
confront an accuser.

Recently, in People v. Brown,6 the New York Court of Appeals
adopted the present sense impression exception to the hearsay
rule, thereby resolving these issues insofar as New York evidence
law is concerned. 7 The Brown court held that the exception encompassed "spontaneous descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously with the observations [when the] description is substantially corroborated by other evidence."8 The
court added that the present sense testimony may be admitted

inafter Hearsay] (proposing corroboration be required sufficient to prove declarant actually perceived event).
4 See Hearsay, supra note 3, at 675. One commentator argued that identification
of the declarant is not necessary because it is possible to establish that he perceived
the event without establishing his identity. Id. The author reasoned that if it can be
corroborated circumstantially that the declarant was a percipient witness, then the
identity of the declarant is irrelevant. Id.
Another commentator stated that courts which have excluded present sense impressions of unidentified declarants have done so because the proponent of the declaration was unable to establish the declarant's percipience, not because the declarant
was unidentified. See Beck, supra note 3, at 1063. Normally this proof is established
circumstantially by a corroborating witness. Id.; see also Jon R. Waltz, Note, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes,
66 IowA L. REv. 869, 878 (1981) (stating that declarant need not be identified);
Kathryn E. Wohlsen, Comment, The PresentSense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DicK. L. REv. 347, 357 (1978) (explaining that courts' hesitancy to admit present sense impressions of unidentified bystanders based on failure to establish declarants' percipience).
5 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment is binding on the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965).
When the declarant is unidentified, the criminal defendant has no opportunity to impeach the declarant or learn if the accuser maintains any bias; hence, it is suggested
that the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are violated. See infra note 43
and accompanying text. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 252 at 440; Passannante, supra note 1, at 94-95 (discussing Sixth Amendment concerns against admitting hearsay in criminal proceeding).
6 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1993).
7 Id. at 731, 610 N.E.2d at 370, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 697. For a recent civil case recognizing the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, see Berger v. City
of New York, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 597 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993) (citing
People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1993)).
8 Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 734, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
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under the exception even though the declarant "isan unidentified
bystander."9
In Brown, police received a 911 call from a man who stated
that he was observing a burglary in progress at a restaurant
across the street from his apartment. 10 Approximately three minutes after the call, two police officers arrived at the scene and observed two males fleeing the restaurant who fit the caller's description." The officers pursued and apprehended the defendant
on the roof of the restaurant.' 2 The caller then telephoned 911 a
second time and reported that the other suspect was still on the
roof, where he was subsequently apprehended.' 3 Although the
his phone
caller identified himself as "Henry" and reported
15
number,' 4 this information later proved to be false.
Over the defendant's objection, the Supreme Court, Bronx
16
County, admitted the 911 tapes as present sense impressions.
The jury found the defendant guilty of burglary in the third degree, criminal mischief, and resisting arrest.' The Appellate Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed and granted
leave to appeal.' 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision below holding that
the 911 tapes were admissible as present sense impressions.' 9 The
court reasoned that the contemporaneity of the caller's statements
and his observations of the burglary left the caller with no time for
reflection, thus eliminating the likelihood of deliberate fabrication
or memory loss. 20 The court, however, also emphasized the need
for additional indicia of reliability to provide sufficient assurance
9 Id. at 734-35, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700 (emphasis added); see
People v. Cook, 603 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984-85 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993) (admitting
911 tape of unidentified declarant as present sense impression exception).
10 148 Misc. 2d 70, 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989).
11 Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 731, 610 N.E.2d at 371, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
12 Brown, 148 Misc. 2d at 71-72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
13 Id. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
14 Id. at 71, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
15 Id. at 72, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 774. After an unsuccessful attempt to verify the
caller's name and phone number, police officers searched the only building from which
the caller could have witnessed the burglary, but could not locate him. Id.
16 People v. Brown, 148 Misc. 2d 70, 559 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1989).
17 Id. The court subsequently denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict. Id. at 75, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
18 People v. Brown, 179 A-D.2d 485, 485, 579 N.Y.S.2d 15, 15 (1st Dep't 1992).
19 Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 731, 610 N.E.2d at 370, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
20 Id. at 732-33, 610 N.E.2d at 371-72, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 698-99.
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that the statements were trustworthy. 21 This corroboration, the
Brown court explained, was provided by the testimony of the police officers who arrived at the scene only three minutes after the
first 911 call.22
As a relatively new hearsay exception, the present sense impression has gained favor with courts because the contemporaneity of the statement and the event leave the declarant with little
or no time for reflection, thus eliminating the risk of fabrication or
memory failure.2 3 Additionally, the statement will often be made
Id. at 736, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
Id. at 736-37, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 701. The police officers testified that the suspects: (1) fit the description given by the caller, (2) were seen running
from the restaurant's broken glass door, and (3) were apprehended on the roof where
the caller reported them to be. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, the officers' testimony corroborated what was clear from the tapes themselves, that the caller's statements were both spontaneous and contemporaneous with the observed events. Id.
23 See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 271, at 211-15; supra note 2. Thayer believed
that the contemporaneity of the out of court declaration guaranteed a statement's
trustworthiness. Thayer II, supra note 1, at 107. Wigmore, however, believed that
only a startling event could guarantee trustworthiness. 6 JoHN H. WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 1750, at 195 (James H. Chadbourne rev., 1976). While the courts began to
apply Wigmore's rationale, Thayer's contemporaneity theory gained favor with Morgan, another prominent scholar. See Morgan, supra note 3, at 236-37 n.19. Morgan
stated that the safeguards presented by contemporaneity were sufficient on their own,
dispensing with the need for the additional safeguard produced by a startling event.
Id. at 237.
As reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), most courts today take the position that a state of excitement is not necessary and that the contemporaneity of the
declaration guarantees sufficient trustworthiness. McCoRMicK, supra note 1, § 271,
at 213; see FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note (underlying theory of present
sense impression is that "substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation"); Berger v. City of
New York, 157 Misc. 2d 521, 522, 597 N.Y.S.2d 555, 556 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
Exactly how contemporaneous the declaration and event must be to meet the requirement has been disputed. Thayer stated, "it is enough that the declaration be
substantially contemporaneous; it need not be literally so." Thayer II, supra note 1,
at 107. The Federal Rules of Evidence adopted Thayer's reasoning. FED. R. Evm. 803
advisory committee's note. The present sense impression exception reflects that exact
contemporaneity will not always be possible and therefore permits a slight time lapse.
Id. In this way, a court may accept present sense impression hearsay when the declarant needed time to "translate his observation into speech." McCoRNIcK, supra
note 1, at 211-15; see People v. Jardin, 154 Misc. 2d 172, 176, 584 N.Y.S.2d 732, 73435 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992) (allowing for slight time lapse between event and
declaration).
Quantitative studies have been conducted tending to show how much time lapse
is allowable before risk of fabrication exists. See Robert M. Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations On The Law Of Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432, 436-37
(1928). See generally Hearsay, supra note 3, at 669-72 (calling for strict
contemporaneity).
21

22
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to a third party who also had the opportunity to observe the situa24
tion as it occurred-thereby furnishing corroboration.
Authorities are split on the degree of corroboration necessary
2 5 Courts'
to assure the reliability of a present sense impression.

views generally fit into one of the following three categories: strict
corroboration requiring bolstering testimony from an equally
percipient witness, 26 corroboration sufficient to ensure reliability
24 McCoRMic, supra note 1, § 271, at 214-15. The third party who hears a declaration usually witnessed the event and can provide corroboration as well as be subjected to cross-examination, allowing the fact finder to judge the witness credibility.
Id. at 215; Wohlsen, supra note 4, at 355 (discussing corroborating witness after having substantial opportunity to observe event); see Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 161
S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. Ct. App. 1942) (requiring corroboration of testifying witness as
prerequisite to admissability of present sense impression); see also Morgan, supra
note 3, at 237 (discussing corroboration provided by third party; infra note 26 (discussing equally percipient witness).
25 The Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly require corroboration. FED. R.
EvID. 803(1). However, some federal courts have read a corroboration requirement
into the rule. Compare United States v. Parker, 936 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1991) (requiring corroboration); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1979) (same) with
First State Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 918 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1990) (no corroboration
required); United States v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 986 (1977); United States v. Obayagbona, 627 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(same). See generally Passannante, supra note 1, at 100-06 (stating split authority
regarding corroboration causes judicial confusion). One commentator has suggested
that the use of Housten Oxygen in the committee advisory notes to Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(1) suggests that the drafters intended a strict corroboration requirement. Waltz, supra note 4, at 883-89.
For state decision requiring corroboration, see Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 494
A.2d 426, 434-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Hewitt v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. 333 N.W.2d
264, 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
For state decisions not requiring corroboration, see State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d
215, 216-18 (Iowa 1979); State v. Jones, 532 A.2d 169, 173 (Md. 1987); Duke v. American Olean Tile Co., 400 N.W.2d 677, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
Until the Court of Appeals decided Brown, New York courts were divided on the
issue of whether corroboration was necessary. See People v. Jardin, 154 Misc. 2d 172,
175, 584 N.Y.S.2d 732, 735 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992) (requiring corroboration);
People v. Graham, 181 A.D.2d 504, 505, 580 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (1st Dep't 1992)
(same); People v. Watson, 100 A.D.2d 452,464-69,474 N.Y.S.2d 978, 987-89 (2d Dep't
1984) (requiring corroboration); Brown, 579 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16, 179 A.D.2d 485, 486 (1st
Dep't 1992) (no corroboration required); People v. Luke, 136 Misc. 2d 733, 519
N.Y.S.2d 316, 318-19 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1987) (no corroboration required), aff'd,
147 A.D.2d 990, 538 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1st Dep't 1989); see supra note 3 (discussing corroboration requirement); see, e.g., McCopiumIC, supranote 1, § 271, at 211-15 (underlying rationale of present sense impression exception offers sufficient assurances of
trustworthiness without added requirement of corroboration).
26 Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 729, 610 N.E.2d at 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 696. An equally
percipient witness is a "witness at the scene who had an equal opportunity to perceive
the event and who will be subject to cross-examination as to the accuracy of the declarant's statement." Id. at 735, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700. The Brown
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of the statement, 2 7 and no corroboration at all. 28 The Brown court
adopted the middle ground, holding that sufficient corroboration
would be required before a present sense impression would be
admitted.29
Although it is conceded that the court's corroboration requirement 30 helps to enhance reliability, it is nevertheless submitted
that corroboration alone may not be an adequate substitute for
cross-examination when the present sense impression admitted
against a criminal defendant originates from an unidentified declarant. The Brown court appeared to reason that as long as sufficient corroboration existed, an unidentified declarant presented
no additional risk.3 ' Corroboration, however, does not protect a
defendant from the prejudice inherent in being deprived of the
ability to impeach the declarant.12 In a criminal trial, this takes
court recognized that this was the theory as Thayer advocated it. Id. Although it has
been generally accepted that both Thayer and Morgan required an equally percipient
witness, their writings may merely have been recognizing that an equally percipient
witness would usually exist, rather than establishing it as an element of the exception. See Beck, supra note 3, at 1069 n.83; Hearsay, supra note 3, at 672-73 n.29.
The Brown court concluded, however, that such strict corroboration would "deprive the exception of most, if not all, of its usefulness." Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 735, 610
N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700. The court stated that there would be no need for
the hearsay evidence if such an eyewitness were available to testify. Id.
27 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing courts which require some
level of corroboration).
28 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (citing courts which do not require
corroboration).
29 Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 736, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d 700. The court reasoned that because the defendant cannot cross-examine the declarant, the defendant's
only protection against contrived or misrepresented testimony admitted as a present
sense impression is to require additional indicia of reliability. Id. The court explained
that the degree of corroboration necessary should be assessed on a case-by-case basis
and left to the trial judge's discretion. Id. at 737, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d 701.
The court was clear, however, that the declaration itself would be insufficient to assure that it was made spontaneously and contemporaneously with the event. Id.
30 See supra note 25.
31 Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 736-37, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01. The
court reasoned that, since the defendant was deprived of the assurances that crossexamination provides, it was reasonable to require additional indicia of reliability. Id.
at 736, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 701. The court stated that the police officers' testimony supplied sufficient corroboration to render the caller's statement reliable. Id. at 736-37, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
32 See Randolf N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth
Amendment, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 557, 586 (1988). Corroboration does not replace the
testing of evidence provided by cross-examination. Id. Cross-examination allows the
opponent to test and challenge a witness's testimony. Id. The opportunity to impeach
a witness is critical since the fact-finder is unlikely to rely on the words of a witness
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on constitutional implications by denying defendants the right to
confront their accusers. 3
who has been shown to lack credibility, possesses a bias, or has a criminal record. Id.;
see infra note 37.
33 The Sixth Amendment, and its counterpart in the New York State constitution,
provide the accused with the opportunity to confront his accuser. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6. The rule against hearsay testimony protects similar interests and "operates to preserve the ability of a party to confront the witnesses
against him in open court." McComuscic, supra note 1, § 252, at 126.
The assurances provided by the Confrontation Clause and the rule against hearsay include: cross-examination of witnesses, testimony taken under oath, ability of
jury to observe witnesses' demeanor, and the right to confront the witness face to face.
McComucK, supra note 1, § 245, at 93-96; see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970) (stating Confrontation Clause ensures accused has opportunity to cross-examine accuser, and protects against peijury by taking testimony under oath); Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (stating that accused should be given opportunity to face accuser and jury should be able to observe accuser's demeanor). "These
means of testing accuracy are so important that the absence of proper confrontation
at trial calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact finding process." Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has recognized that although the Confrontation Clause and
the hearsay rule are designed to protect similar interests, Green, 399 U.S. at 155, the
Confrontation Clause bars the admission of some hearsay that would otherwise be
admissible as a hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990). Similarly, the rule against hearsay may bar admission of some testimony that would
otherwise not violate the Confrontation Clause. Id.; Green, 399 U.S. at 155-66.
To justify admitting hearsay, sufficient reliability must be present to offset the
absence of the Sixth Amendment assurances. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 23, § 1422,
at 253. Wigmore reasoned that:
The theory of the hearsay rule... is that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare untested
assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if they exist,
by the test of cross-examination. But this test or security may in a given
instance be superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance, that
the statement offered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of
supererogation.
Id. § 1420, at 251.
The reliability of the present sense impression exception lies in its contemporaneity. See supra note 23. When however does such reliability fall short of satisfying the
Confrontation Clause?
The Supreme Court has held that a hearsay statement must possess sufficient
indicia of reliability to be admitted before a jury. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89
(1970). For those hearsay exceptions that are "firmly rooted" in our jurisprudence,
sufficient reliability is deemed to exist. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Whether the present
sense impression exception violates the Confrontation Clause when the declarant is
unidentified, therefore, requires a determination: is the present sense impression a
firmly rooted hearsay exception? The Court has not yet answered this question. See
McComncK, supra note 1, § 252, at 124; see also supra note 5 (discussing Sixth
Amendment implications generally); infra note 39 (discussing firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions).
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In Ohio v. Roberts,3 4 the United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining when hearsay evidence
could be admitted against a criminal defendant without violating
his constitutional right to confront his accusers2 First, the prosecutor must either produce the declarant or prove he is unavailable.3 6 This first element, however, has been eroded by subsequent
decisions holding that unavailability is not universally required. 7
Second, the statements must be supported by sufficient indicia of
reliability.38 The Court noted that sufficient indicia of reliability
can be inferred when the exception is a firmly rooted one;3 9 all
34 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
35 Id. at 66; see People v. Sanders 56 N.Y.2d 51, 436 N.E.2d 480, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30
(1982) (applying Roberts test); People v. Bridges, 184 A.D.2d 1042, 584 N.Y.S.2d 360
(4th Dep't 1992) (same).
36 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
37 Id. In several cases subsequent to Roberts, the Court stated that the unavailability requirement applied only to prior statements made during a judicial proceeding
(former testimony hearsay exception). White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992)
(holding unavailability requirement inapplicable to excited utterances and statements made in pursuit of medical diagnosis); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
400 (1986) (holding unavailability requirement inapplicable to co-conspirators statements). White and Inadi have eroded the unavailability requirement for firmly rooted
exceptions, and it remains to be seen whether the Court will require unavailability for
other firmly rooted exceptions. Similarly, whether unavailability will still be required
for exceptions which are not firmly rooted remains an open issue. See Margaret A.
Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a
ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 557, 559 (1992).
The unavailability requirement for prior testimony merely recognizes that a current version of courtroom testimony is preferable to a former version. See People v.
Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 344, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262, 266 (1st Dep't 1990). Unavailability
forms no part of the confrontation analysis when the value of the hearsay in question
flows from the fact that it was uttered in or about the time of the events described.
See, e.g., White, 112 S. Ct. 736 (excited utterances); Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (coconspirators).
Until the court of appeals addresses the issue, it is uncertain whether unavailability still applies as a requirement under the New York State Constitution. See
Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 64, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (declining to decide
whether New York constitution affords broader protection to defendant than U.S.
Constitution). New York lower courts, however, have required unavailability for hearsay exceptions when the federal courts have not; thus providing broader protection to
the criminal defendant under the New York constitution than the United States Constitution. See Persico, 157 A-D.2d at 344, 349, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 266, 269 (holding unavailability required under co-conspirator hearsay exception); see also People v. Cook,
603 N.Y.S.2d 979, 985 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993) (requiring that declarant be unavailable to admit hearsay under present sense impression).
38 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
39 Id. The Supreme Court has not delineated which hearsay exceptions are firmly
rooted and which are not. See McCoRMicK, supra note 1, § 252, at 443. Instead, the
Court has approached the issue on a case-by-case basis. See White, 112 S. Ct. at 742-
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other hearsay exceptions should be excluded under the Sixth
Amendment unless the prosecution can demonstrate "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."40
It is submitted that the present sense impression exception is
not firmly rooted in New York. 41 Therefore, in order to be admis43 (holding spontaneous declaration and statements made in pursuit of medical diagnosis were firmly rooted exceptions); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (holding residual hearsay exception was not firmly rooted); Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (holding co-conspirators statements are firmly rooted exception);
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (holding admission of co-defendant's confession is not firmly rooted exception); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (holding prior statements
made during judicial proceeding are firmly rooted).
The Court has defined a firmly rooted exception as one which possesses sufficient
reliability acquired from the "weight [of] longstanding judicial and legislative experience in assessing [its] trustworthiness ... ." Wright, 497 U.S. at 817 (citations omitted). A hearsay exception which is not firmly rooted does not possess the same "tradition of reliability" that renders firmly rooted exceptions admissible. Id.
40 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
Although the Court has refused to lay out a mechanical test for when "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are present, it stated that the principal issue is
whether the circumstances tend to prove that the declarant was telling the truth.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. The guarantees are drawn from the "totality of the circumstances." Id. at 820. However, the only circumstances relevant in determining if such
guarantees exist are those surrounding the making of the statement and that render
the declarant particularly trustworthy. Id. at 820. The corroboration must refer to
the making of the declaration itself, not to the occurrence of the criminal act. Id. at
821 (quoting State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984)); see United States v.
Esquivel, 755 F. Supp. 434 (D.D.C. 1990).
41 See People v. Cook, 159 Misc. 2d 430, 435, 603 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1993) (holding present sense impression not firmly rooted, but admitting 911 tape of unidentified declarant). The court applied two different tests to determine whether the present sense impression was firmly rooted. Id. First, the court
asked whether there was "long-standing judicial and legislative experience" with the
exception. Id. (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990)). The court responded in the negative, noting that the court of appeals had not accepted the present
sense impression exception until the 1993 Brown decision. Id. Second, the court
asked whether the exception was "inherently reliable." Id. (quoting Persico, 157
A.D.2d at 348, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 268. Again the court answered no, especially under the
facts of the case-one declarant was unidentified and another was a possible participant in the incident. Id. Despite these uncertainties the court determined, without
discussion, that there existed sufficient indicia of reliability to admit the 911 tape of
an unidentified declarant under the present sense impression exception. Id. at 980,
984; see supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions).
The present sense impression suffers from an uncertain evolution. See McCoRucK, supra note 1, § 271, at 474; supra note 23 and accompanying text. From its
inception the exception was not readily accepted, as scholars disagreed over its basis
of reliability. See McComcICK, supra note 1, § 271, at 474; supra note 23 and accompanying text. While some followed Wigmore's rationale that a state of excitement was
required to assure reliability, others adopted the Thayer/Morgan rationale that contemporaneity provided reliability. See supra note 23. Additionally, judicial use of the
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sible against a criminal defendant who objects on constitutional
grounds, the statement itself must possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.4 2 It is suggested that such guarantees
43
can rarely be established when the declarant is unidentified.

If

exception did not emerge until the 1940s. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 271, at 474; see
Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1942); Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost,
10 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1942). Prior to these cases, courts generally admitted contemporaneous statements under the murky concept of res gestae. McCoRMICK, supra note 1,
§ 271, at 474.
Res Gestae is a generic term which has been criticized throughout history because
of its apparent vagueness. Id. § 268, at 472. The term encompasses four separate
hearsay exceptions: declarations as to present bodily conditions; declarations of present mental states and emotions; excited utterances; and declarations of present sense
impressions. Id. Thayer believed the term res gestae "did for [lawyers and judges]
what the 'limbo' of the theologians did for them..." Thayer II, supra note 1, at 817.
Morgan called the term a substitute for reasoning. Morgan, supra note 3, at 229.
Moreover, since most contemporaneous statements were made under the influence of an exciting event, the excited utterance exception was applicable. McCoRICK,
supra note 1, § 271, at 474. Unexciting events infrequently give rise to declarations
which later have bearing upon litigation. Id. at 475. In New York, however, the present sense impression developed independently of the res gestae. Cook, 603 N.Y.S.2d at
984 n.4.
Based upon this evaluation, the present sense impression exception does not
share the history of reliability of the firmly rooted exceptions. See Stanley A.
Goldman, Not So "FirmlyRooted". Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L.
REv. 1, 27 (1987) (arguing that present sense impression is not firmly rooted). But
see Guam v. Ignacio, No. 91-00107A, 1992 WL 245633, at *3 (D. Guam Sept. 11, 1992)
(same), aff'd, 10 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and leaving unanswered whether present sense impression is firmly
rooted); United States v. Vega, 883 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding present sense
impression firmly rooted); Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984)
(same); Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp 1341 (D.N.J. 1982) (concluding present sense
impression is firmly rooted exception); State v. Brown, 618 So. 2d 629 (La. 1993)
(holding present sense impression firmly rooted).
42 See supra note 40 (discussing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness).
The critical issue to admissability of hearsay is whether the cross-examination
would have weakened the effect of the prosecutor's evidence in the fact-finder's mind
and rendered the evidence more favorable to the defendant. See Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74 (1970). The defendant does not have the opportunity to determine this issue
when the declarant is unidentified. See Jonakait, supra note 32, at 595. Therefore,
an unidentified declarant's present sense impression is inherently untrustworthy and
lacks particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See S. Douglas Borisky, Reconciling the Conflict between the CoconspiratorExemption from the Hearsay Rule and
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1316
(1985).
43 Assuming that the present sense impression exception is not firmly rooted, the
admissability of such hearsay would hinge upon a showing of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Wright, 497 U.S. at 816-17;
supra note 37.
Applying the Wright analysis to the Brown facts, it is apparent that there were no
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness because nothing was known about the
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the defendant is deprived of cross-examination, some basis should
be provided by which the fact-finder can assess the credibility of
the declarant.r Furthermore, the defendant should have the opportunity to impeach the hearsay declarant, for example, by a
showing of strong bias, bad reputation for truth or veracity, or
prior convictions, none of which can be established when the declarant is unidentified.' 5 The Brown court failed to address this
issue.46 Therefore, it is submitted that Brown does not preclude a
defendant from challenging the admissability of an unidentified
declarant's present sense impression on constitutional grounds.
While the Brown court correctly recognized the need to bolster the element of contemporaneity with a corroboration requirement, the court stopped short of providing adequate safeguards of
reliability by admitting hearsay evidence of an unidentified declarant against a criminal defendant.
Rose Margaret Casey

declarant at all. See Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 364, 564 N.Y.S.2d 596. Because the declarant is unidentified, there is no basis for his trustworthiness. The
police officers' testimony corroborated the truth of the hearsay statement, not the
trustworthiness of the declarant, as required under Wright. See Wright, 497 U.S. at
821. Wright emphasized the trustworthiness of the declarant. Id. When the declarant
is unidentified it is virtually impossible to assess his trustworthiness. Therefore,
since the declarant's trustworthiness cannot be established, the hearsay does not
meet the strict standard of "particular guarantees of trustworthiness", even though
corroboration of the event itself exists. But see Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 510 (3d
Cir. 1985) (admitting under present sense impression exception statement by unidentified declarant, but requiring proponent carry heavier burden than for identified declarant); Booth v. State, 508 A.2d 976, 981-82 (Md. 1986) (admitting under present
sense impression exception statement by unidentified declarant); People v. Buras, 324
N.W.2d 589, 592 (Mich. 1982) (same).
44 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 819-21. To possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness hearsay evidence must be so trustworthy that "adversarial testing would
add little to [its] reliability." Id. at 821. Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
depend upon the trustworthiness of the declarant, which is assessed by the circumstances that surround the making of the statement and the render the declarant
trustworthy. Id. at 819. The circumstances include motive to fabricate the statement,
bias, or lack of credibility in general. See id. at 824.
45 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing impeachment).
46 See Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696.

